

Computation with Varied-Strength Attacks in Abstract Argumentation Frameworks

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Overview

- AFs with varied strength attacks. (AFV)
- Scenarios, updates & equilibria.
- Decision questions specific to AFVs.
- Complexity results.
- Conclusions & development.

AFs & varied-strength attacks (AFVs)

- Modifies standard $\langle X, A \rangle$ structure by –
Partitioning A into $\{A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n\}$
Adding binary relation R over $[n]$ to obtain 4 relations
- These describe comparative “*strengths*”
 - $j \ll k$ – A_j is “*weaker*” than A_k (only $\langle k, j \rangle \in R$)
 - $j \gg k$ – A_j is “*stronger*” than A_k (only $\langle j, k \rangle \in R$)
 - $j \approx k$ – A_j “*equivalent force*” to A_k ($\langle j, k \rangle$ & $\langle k, j \rangle \in R$)
 - $j ? k$ – A_j “*unknown difference*” from A_k (neither in R)

What does this buy?

- Many variants of AFs are concerned with rationales for *excluding attacks*. This is the case with PAFs, VAFs, EAFs, weighted systems, AFRAs, etc.
- AFV semantics *do not deal* with discounting attacks but are directed at distinguishing different “*qualities*” of *defences*.
- Informally, if x is “attacked” by y and we have a choice of p or q as counterattacks (“*defences*”) then we prefer to use whichever of $\{ \langle p, y \rangle, \langle q, y \rangle \}$ is “*stronger*”.
- and, of course, want such defences to be “*at least as*” “*powerful*” as the attack $\langle y, x \rangle$.

Admissible Scenarios

- Let $S \subseteq X$ and $P \subseteq \{\ll, \gg, \approx, ?\}$. Structures of interest in AFVs are pairs $[S, P]$ called *attack scenarios*.
- Given $x \in X$, x is acceptable wrt $[S, P]$ if:
 $\forall y$ s.t. $\langle y, x \rangle \in A_j \exists z \in S, \rho \in P \langle z, y \rangle \in A_k \ \& \ k \rho j$
- $[S, P]$ is an *admissible scenario* if S is conflict-free & every $x \in S$ is acceptable wrt $[S, P]$.


Differentiating defences

- Suppose $\{u, x, y, z\} \subseteq X$ with $\langle u, x \rangle \in A_i$, $\langle y, u \rangle \in A_j$, $\langle z, u \rangle \in A_k$. Then:
 y dominates z (for x) if $k \gg j$.
- $[S, P]$ is a *stronger collective defence* (of x) than $[T, Q]$ if –
 - x is acceptable to $[S, P]$ & $[T, Q]$
 - $\forall y \in T, z \in S$ y does *not* dominate z (for x)
 - $\exists p \in S, q \in T \setminus S$: p dominates q (for x)

$[\{a,c\},\{>>, \approx\}]$

stronger collective defence (for **a**) than

$[\{a,d\},\{>>, \approx\}]$



Top admissibility & upgrades

- The notion of “*top admissible scenario*” captures that of “*best defence*”.
- $[S, P]$ is *top admissible* if it is both admissible and for each $x \in S$ no admissible scenario $[T, Q]$ with $x \in T$ provides a stronger collective defence (for x).
- If $[T, P]$ is a stronger defence (for x) the *upgraded defence* – $\text{upgd}(x, S, T, P)$ – is
$$[S \setminus \text{def}(x, [S, P]) \cup \text{def}(x, [T, P], P).$$
- Here, $\text{def}(x, [S, P])$ denotes the defenders of x in S .
- Upgraded defence: not *always admissible scenario*.
- $[S, P]$ is *equilibrated* if no $x \in S$ can be upgraded to *admissible* $[T, P]$ without *weakening* some $y \in S \cap T$.

Decision problems in AFVs

- 3 natural problems suggested by formal definitions above –
 - Top Admissible Scenario (**TAS**)
 - Admissible Upgrade (**AU**)
 - Equilibrated Scenario (**ES**)
- **TAS** – is $[S,P]$ top admissible?
- **AU** – given $[S,P]$ is there *any admissible* upgrade $[T,P]$ for this?
- **ES** – is $[S,P]$ an equilibrated scenario?

& their complexity


- All of these, in the most general case, turn out to be *computationally hard*: –
 - TAS is coNP-complete;
 - AU is NP-complete;
 - ES is coNP-complete.
- Proofs use variant of the well-known translation from CNF *formulae* to AFs.
- Need, however, to incorporate elements for *partition* of A and the *relation* R .

TAS is coNP-complete I

- Start from a variant of CNF-SAT: the “*more than one SAT*” problem (MTOS).
- Given a CNF, $\varphi(Z)$, (with *each literal* from Z occurring in *some* clause) & a *satisfying assignment*, α , MTOS reports true if there is a satisfying assignment *in addition to* α .
- MTOS is “easily” shown NP-complete.

$$\varphi(Z) = \{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_m\} \ \& \ \varphi(\perp, \dots, \perp)$$

$$\text{MTOS}(\varphi(Z), \langle \perp, \perp, \dots, \perp \rangle) \Leftrightarrow \neg \text{TAS}([\{\varphi, \neg z_1, \dots, \neg z_n\}, \{\>\>, \approx\}])$$



Consequences

- Note that construction holds even when partition of A contains *exactly two* sets.
- That AU is NP -complete is a direct corollary of the reduction establishing TAS to be $coNP$ -complete.
- A slightly more involved construction (but not requiring variant of CNF -SAT) shows that ES is $coNP$ -complete.

Conclusions & Development

- AFVs provide an approach to distinguishing “quality of defence” by specifying an ordering over a partition of the attack relation.
- Via this a number of natural decision questions arise regarding the “optimality” of defensive positions.
- These, however, are computationally hard.
- One useful development would be to identify cases where efficient algorithms are possible.
- Alternative criteria for capturing “equilibrium” properties are also of some interest.